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Criminal and civil law differ greatly in their use of the element of in-
tent. The purposes of intent in each legal system are tailored to
effectuate very different goals. The Supreme Court's recent decision in
Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060 (2011),
however imported a criminal concept of intent-willful blindness-into
the statute for patent infringement, a civil offense. This importation of
a criminal law concept of intent into the patent statute is novel and
calls for examination. This Article compares the purposes behind intent
in criminal law with the purposes behind intent in patent law to
demonstrate that this importation does not achieve the policy goals of
the patent regime. Criminal law jurisprudence requires an intent ele-
ment for three reasons: to ascribe a level of moral blameworthiness to
an act, to separate criminal from civil liability, and to shield otherwise
innocently acting defendants from criminal punishment. Patent in-
fringement actions, by contrast, lack an intent element because they
almost exclusively seek to remedy economic harms. The importation of
criminal concepts of knowledge into the patent infringement statute
may therefore lead to unwanted consequences, particularly, higher-
than-warranted burdens of proof for patent holders. To this end,
equating criminal mental states to civil ones risks treating patent in-
fringement as criminal conduct. This Article concludes by proposing
that courts should examine the purposes of mental state requirements
on a statute-by-statute basis.
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INTRODUCTION
While "it is true enough that civil and criminal cases do not always
stand in bold relief to one another,"' "[i]n no one thing does criminal juris-
prudence differ more from civil . .. than in its different doctrine concerning
... intent."2 The terms used to describe criminal intent are "tailored to the
criminal law ... to require a ... criminal intent beyond the purpose other-
wise required for guilt, or an additional bad purpose, or specific intent to
violate a known legal duty created by highly technical statutes."3 The terms
used to describe intent in a civil violation "typically present[] neither the
textual nor the substantive reasons for pegging the threshold of liability at
knowledge of wrongdoing."' The Supreme Court's recent decision in Glob-
al-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A.' violates this longstanding separation
between criminal and civil mental states. There, the Court imported a con-
cept of willful blindness, a criminal law species of intent, into patent law, a
solely civil field. 6 This importation continues a trend where "the distinction
1. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 140 (1996) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
2. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 69 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting J. BISH-
OP, CRIMINAL LAW § 285 (5th ed. 1872)).
3. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 57 n.9 (2007) (internal citations omit-
ted).
4. Id.
5. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060 (2011).
6. Id. at 2065. It should be noted that nothing in the patent statute provides criminal
penalties for any violation of its provisions. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 281-97 (2011).
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between criminal and civil law seems to be collapsing across a broad front."'
A comparison of the purposes behind the intent, or mens rea, requirement in
criminal law with the infringement statute in patent law demonstrates that
the Court's haste in Global-Tech may lead to unwanted consequences in
patent infringement and other civil actions.
Generally, patent infringement is a strict liability civil offense.' It does
not matter whether the conduct of the alleged infringer was malicious or
innocent of heart; the patent infringement statute imposes liability on all
those who make, use, sell, or offer to sell a patented invention without the
authority of the patent holder.9 In a typical action for patent infringement,
the mental state of an accused infringer is irrelevant.'0
In a criminal action, however, the mental state of the defendant is all-
important. The Supreme Court has long presumed that "an injury can
amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention."" Without some base
level of criminal intent, a defendant cannot be held criminally liable for his
conduct.'2 To color the appropriate mental state required for conviction,
courts and legislators have developed a kaleidoscope of phrases and con-
cepts to describe mens rea, from "malice aforethought" to simple
"scienter." 3 Each of these has adopted a textured legal nuance, furthering
the principal purposes of criminal law.'4
There are generally three historical justifications for the mens rea re-
quirement in criminal law. One-mental states illustrate particular levels of
moral culpability for their crimes. A criminal defendant who purposefully
kills someone is more morally culpable than a defendant who does so by
accident.'" Two-a mental state requirement allows for differentiation be-
tween criminal and civil liability for the same physical act. Federal statutes
in securities, labor, antitrust, and even food and drug law attach mental
states to otherwise civil offenses, primarily for the purpose of distinguishing
what is civil and what is criminal.' 6 And three-where the physical act is
7. Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies to Achieve Criminal
Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law Distinction, 42
HASTINGs L.J. 1325, 1325 (1991).
8. In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc) ("[Platent
infringement is a strict liability offense .... .").
9. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2011) ("[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers to
sell, or sells any patented invention . .. infringes the patent.").
10. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 35 (1997)
("Application of the doctrine of equivalents, therefore, is akin to determining literal infringe-
ment, and neither requires proof of intent."); Intel Corp. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 946 F.2d
821, 832 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("[T]here is no intent element to direct infringement.") (emphasis
omitted).
I1. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952).
12. Id. at 250-51.
13. Id. at 252.
14. See id.
15. See infra Part Hl.A.
16. See infra Part II.B.
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itself innocent, mens rea requirements shield less culpable defendants from
the maw of criminal punishment."
Mental states in the patent infringement statute are concerned with none
of these justifications. They do not seek to attach moral culpability to an
infringer.'8 They have no need to differentiate civil from criminal liability
because infringement actions are solely civil in nature-unlike hybrid civil-
criminal actions such as certain copyright violations.' 9 And they do not seek
to establish a minimum level of moral culpability to shield "innocent" in-
fringers because patent infringement actions, in fact, typically punish
otherwise morally innocent conduct.20 Rather, the purpose of patent in-
fringement actions is almost solely economic: to allow patent holders to
receive compensation for the unauthorized use of their inventions.2' This is
distinct even from other traditional property torts, such as trespass or nui-
sance, which have, at their core, moral and social utilitarian functions.22
Despite these distinctions, the Supreme Court in Global-Tech imported
a criminal mens rea standard of willful blindness into the patent infringe-
ment statute.23 In discussing whether the inducement of patent infringement
under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) requires the accused inducer to possess knowledge
of the asserted patent, the Court answered, "Yes."24 But, in determining the
type of knowledge required, the Court declared that a defendant must be at
least willfully blind-as that term is understood in criminal law-to poten-
tial infringement, 25 casting aside prior Federal Circuit law on the issue.26
Though it may appear that Global-Tech is limited to inducement actions, the
Supreme Court's approach to attaching criminal mens rea concepts to civil
law violations suggests that the lower courts may similarly import other
criminal mens rea standards into the infringement statute. 27
The Supreme Court's importation of a criminal mens rea standard into
the patent infringement statute does not advance the goals of patent in-
fringement actions. Willful blindness, as imported from criminal law,
requires a defendant's knowledge of an act's illegality as a substantive ele-
17. See infra Part IV.
I 8. See Mark Chandler, The Patent System's Relationship to Digital Entrepreneurship,
112 W. VA. L. REV. 199, 202-03 (2009) (discussing the amorality of patent infringement
suits).
19. See 17 U.S.C. § 501 (2011) (creating civil liability for copyright infringement); id.
§ 506 (imposing criminal penalties for willful copyright infringement).
20. See In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc).
21. See infra Part Ill.
22. Infra Part III.
23. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060,2065 (2011).
24. Id. at 2068; see also 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2011).
25. Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2068.
26. See DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (en banc)
(allowing a civil "knew or should have known" standard regarding potential infringement).
27. See infra Part IV.C.
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ment of the crime. 28 The same cannot be said of actions for patent infringe-
ment, which seek only to remedy the unauthorized use of the plaintiff's
patent.29 This apparent doctrinal movement founders for a number of rea-
sons: it disallows legitimately harmed patent holders economic
compensation, it continues a trend of conflating criminal and civil law con-
cepts, and it fails to effectuate the diverse purposes behind the inclusion of
mental states in civil lawsuits.3 0
This Article discusses and compares the purposes behind mental states
in criminal and patent law and argues that the importation of mental states
from one area of the law into another, as in Global-Tech, fails to comport
with each discipline's purposes. Part I briefly discusses the Global-Tech
case as a focus for the discussion about the importation of criminal mental
states into patent law. Part II examines the purposes of a mens rea require-
ment in criminal law, namely that it seeks to establish a level of immorality
to the crime, differentiates crimes from torts premised on the same physical
act, and establishes a minimum level of culpability to the defendant for an
otherwise innocent act. Part Ill demonstrates that the primary purpose of
patent infringement suits is economic relief, unlike other similar property
torts, such as trespass and nuisance, which also have moral and social utili-
tarian functions. Part IV criticizes the potential consequences of mixing
criminal and patent mental states. The Article concludes by calling for the
prevention of construing patent infringement as criminal conduct.
I. GLOBAL-TECH APPLIANCES, INC. v. SEB S.A.
Those who have attempted deep-frying at home know that it is a peri-
lous activity: deep fryers typically operate around 310oF,3' more than hot
enough to cause serious burns. 32 It is for this reason that French kitchenware
company SEB S.A. began, in the 1980s, to develop an inexpensive and safe
home deep fryer.33 In 1990, SEB was awarded with U.S. Patent No.
4,995,312, which claimed a deep fryer that would be not only cheap, but also
safe to the user's touch while operating. 34 The fryer encased an electrically
28. See Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2068-69.
29. See infra Part Ill.
30. See infra Part IV.
31. Deep-frying is, in fact, a combination of simultaneously occurring chemical pro-
cesses, including the Maillard reaction, the combination of sugars and proteins that give fried
food its taste and dark appearance. See MONoJ K. GUPTA, KATHLEEN WARNER & PAMELA J.
WHITE, FRYING TECHNOLOGY AND PRACTICES 51 (2004) (discussing the chemical reactions
accompanying deep-frying, including the Maillard reaction); JEFF POTTER, COOKING FOR
GEEKS 205 (2010) (describing the Maillard reaction at 310oF).
32. See W. Schubert, D.H. Ahrenholz and L.D. Solem, Burns from Hot Oil and Grease:
A Public Health Hazard, II J. BURN CARE REHAB. 558 (1990).
33. See SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 594 F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
34. U.S. Patent No. 4,995,312 col. I 1. 37-47, col. 2 1. 19-24 (filed Aug. 28, 1990).
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operated frying pan in "an inexpensive plastic outer shell, or skirt."35 More
durable plastics could not be used because heat-resistant plastics were too
expensive for mass manufacture.36 The elegance underlying the SEB inven-
tion was to simply suspend the frying pan on top of a thin insulating ring
between it and the skirt, and leaving a space of air between the side of the
pan and plastic side of the fryer housing.37 This is similar, perhaps, to a
thermos.3 1 SEB dubbed its invention the "cool-touch" fryer, and sold it
worldwide. 39
In 1997, SEB's competitor, Sunbeam Products, Inc., asked Pentalpha
Enterprises, Ltd., a Hong Kong company, to supply it with "touch-safe"
deep fryers.4 0 Pentalpha purchased a cool-touch fryer in Hong Kong for the
sake of copying its design and selling it to Sunbeam.4 1 Because the fryer
was sold outside the United States, however, it did not include any U.S. pa-
tent markings to alert Pentalpha that it was protected in the U.S.42
Presumably to insulate itself from its evident plagiarism, Pentalpha hired a
U.S. patent attorney to conduct a patent search-but never informed him
that it copied its design from a competitor's product in Hong Kong.4 3 Pen-
talpha's attorney failed to find SEB's patent and determined that the fryer
Pentalpha lifted from SEB was permissible to sell in the United States."
Pentalpha then sold its fryers to Sunbeam, who began selling Pentalpha's
fryers in the United States.45
SEB soon uncovered Pentalpha's duplicity, and in 1998, sued Sunbeam
for patent infringement.4 6 Despite the lawsuit, Pentalpha boldly continued to
sell its product to two other U.S. companies for importation: Fingerhut
Corp. and Montgomery Ward & Co.47 After settling with Sunbeam, SEB
then sued Pentalpha.4 8
SEB's principal case against Pentalpha focused on "induced infringe-
ment" under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b). That section, in its entirety, provides:
"Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an
35. Montgomery Ward, 594 F.3d at 1365.
36. '312 Patent col. I 1. 37-47.
37. Id. col. I 1. 55-col. 2 1. 8.
38. Here, the frying pan is analogous to the inner container of a thermos. A vacuum,
rather than a wall of air, sits between the inner container and the thermos housing. In both
cases, the vacuum or air prevents the conduction of heat between the interior receptacle and
the exterior housing.
39. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2063 (2011).
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infringer."49 The section does not define "actively induces." In the lay con-
text, inducement typically suggests a purposeful act of persuasion: "to lead
or move by persuasion;" 0 "[t]o lead (a person), by persuasion, or by some
influence or motive that acts upon the will;"5' or "to move by persuasion or
influence."52 But in the patent context, it was previously unclear whether the
object of "inducement" was the act giving rise to infringement (e.g., mak-
ing, using, or selling an invention that happened to be patented)" or
purposeful infringement itself (specifically "persuading" another to infringe
a patent).54 In the former scenario, a defendant would be liable for persuad-
ing or leading another to make an article that happened to be a patented
invention. To prevail on such an inducement claim, the plaintiff would have
only needed to prove that the defendant induced another to make the article
at issue, and that the patent's claims read on the article. In the latter scenar-
io, however, the plaintiff would need to prove that the defendant persuaded
another to make an article that infringed a patented invention and that the
defendant had some knowledge, actual or constructive, that the other's act
constituted infringement.5 5
Although infringement-by-inducement has been a source of liability
since at least 1952,56 courts did not resolve this issue until DSU Medical
Corp. v. JMS Co. in 2006.5' There, the Federal Circuit interpreted induce-
ment as contemplating the latter scenario: the specific inducement of
infringement.58 Infringement-by-inducement required a plaintiff to show
"that the alleged infringer's actions induced infringing acts and that he knew
or should have known his actions would induce actual infringements."5 9 The
court further concluded that the "requirement that the alleged infringer knew
or should have known his actions would induce actual infringement neces-
sarily includes the requirement that he or she knew of the patent.""o This
level of knowledge-that the defendant "knew or should have known his
actions would induce actual infringements" 61-echoed well-worn standards
49. 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2011).
50. Induces Definition, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/
induces (last visited Aug. 09, 2011).
51. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 887-88 (2d ed. 1989).
52. Induces Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/induces (last visited June 17, 2012).
53. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2011).
54. This is the crux of the statutory text the Supreme Court identified in Global-Tech
Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2065 (2011).
55. See id. at 2067.
56. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 historical and revision notes (2011) ("One who actively induc-
es infringement as by aiding and abetting the same is liable as an infringer ... .").
57. DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (en banc).
58. Id. at 1304.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. (emphasis added).
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of "constructive knowledge,"62 and borrowed from older common law patent
cases on the subject.63
At trial, the jury found that Pentalpha had "actively induced" the in-
fringement of SEB's Patent, and the court granted SEB enhanced damages
and attorney fees.64 Prejudgment interest alone totaled $1.7 million.65 On
appeal, Pentalpha argued it did not possess the necessary intent to sustain a
claim for infringement-by-inducement. 66 Pentalpha reasoned that because it
"had no actual knowledge of the patent during part of the time it was selling
deep fryers to Sunbeam," it could not be said to have "actively induced"
infringement of SEB's patent.67 The appellate court disagreed. Reading its
prior precedent in DSU Medical,68 the Federal Circuit concluded that the
mental state required for infringement-by-inducement was broader than "ac-
tual knowledge."69 As an example, the court borrowed the concept of
"deliberate indifference" from Farmer v. Brennan7 -a prisoner civil-rights
Supreme Court case-to show that active inducement could be proven
where the evidence pointed to "a subjective determination that the defendant
knew of and disregarded the overt risk that an element of the offense exist-
ed."71 Though "no direct evidence [showed] that Pentalpha had actual
knowledge of the patent,"7 2 the court concluded that "[t]he record . . . con-
tain[ed] considerable evidence of deliberate indifference" to the risk of
62. See, e.g., Harris Trust and Say. Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 530 U.S. 238,
251 (2000) (concluding that knowledge of an illegal transfer of funds could be proven by
"constructive knowledge," whether "the transferee (assuming he has purchased for value)
knew or should have known of the existence of the trust and the circumstances that rendered
the transfer in breach of the trust"); Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los Santos, 451 U.S.
156, 178 (1981) (affirming appellate court reversal where the district court "should not itself
have resolved, with respect to the [defendant's] actual or constructive knowledge of the condi-
tion of [a defective] winch" where "the [defendant] vessel should have known the facts"
giving rise to its alleged defectiveness); Spruce v. Sargent, 149 F.3d 783, 786 (8th Cir. 1998)
("[I]t is true that constructive knowledge, or the 'should-have-known' standard, is not suffi-
cient to support a finding of deliberate indifference . . . .").
63. See Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co. (Aro II), 377 U.S. 476, 489-
90 (1964). Ironically, however, the cases cited in Aro II to support a constructive knowledge
theory of inducement "long recognized the fundamental proposition that '[t]o constitute an
infringement of a patent, it is not necessary that the infringer should have known of the exist-
ence of the patent at the time he infringed it or, knowing of its existence, it is not necessary
that he should have known his doings to constitute an infringement.'" Id. at 491 n.8 (Harlan,
Brennan, Stewart, and Goldberg, J.J., dissenting).
64. SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., No. 99 Civ. 9284 (SCR), 2008 WL
4540416, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2008).
65. Id. at *5.
66. SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward& Co., 594 F.3d 1360, 1375-78 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
67. Id. at 1373.
68. DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (en banc).
69. SEB, 594 F.3d at 1376-77.
70. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
71. SEB, 594 F.3d at 1376.
72. Id. at 1377.
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infringement.73 The panel further noted that, despite its decision, "[t]his
opinion does not purport to establish the outer limits of the type of
knowledge needed for inducement,"74 and suggested that, in some circum-
stances, mere "constructive knowledge"-where the alleged inducer "should
have known" of the patent7l-may suffice as proof of inducement. 6 Conse-
quently, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's decision on the issue
of inducement." Pentalpha then petitioned for a writ of certiorari, which the
Supreme Court granted four months later. 8
The Supreme Court boiled down its review of Pentalpha's appeal to the
question of "whether a party who 'actively induces infringement of a patent'
under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) must know that the induced acts constitute patent
infringement."" "Finding no definitive answer in the statutory text,"80 the
Court looked sidelong to its jurisprudence on "contributory infringement,"
that is, where a defendant offers to sell or sells a "component" of a patented
article "constituting a material part of the invention, [and] knowing the same
to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of
such patent."81 The Court's previous decision in Aro Manufacturing Co. v.
Convertible Top Replacement Co. (Aro II) elucidated that contributory in-
fringement's knowing-the-same element required specific knowledge of the
infringed patent.82 This gloss, the Court concluded, had since "become a
fixture in the law of contributory infringement" in the intervening half-
century.83 Concluding that both contributory and induced infringement were
birthed from the same common law origin, the Court decided that active
inducement similarly required knowledge of the infringed patent, finding
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1378.
75. Id. at 1376-77 (equating an objective "should have known" standard to constructive
knowledge of a patent).
76. Id. at 1378.
77. Id. at 1381.
78. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 458 (2010) (mem.). The par-
ent corporation of Pentalpha, Global-Tech Appliances, Inc., replaced Pentalpha as petitioner.
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at ii, Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct.
2060 (2011) (No. 10-6), 2010 WL 2813550.
79. Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2063.
80. Id. at 2065.
81. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2011). The full text of the statute reads: "Whoever offers to sell
or sells within the United States or imports into the United States a component of a patented
machine, manufacture, combination, or composition, or a material or apparatus for use in
practicing a patented process, constituting a material part of the invention, knowing the same
to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not
a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use, shall be
liable as a contributory infringer." Id.
82. Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co. (Aro II), 377 U.S. 476 (1964).
83. Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2068 (quoting 5 R. CARL MOY, MOY'S WALKER ON PA-
TENTS § 15:20 (4th ed. 2009)).
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that rare solace in "the 'special force' of the doctrine of stare decisis with
regard to questions of statutory interpretation." 84
The Court went on to conclude that a criminal concept of willful blind-
ness should apply to accused "inducers.""8 This standard, reasoned the
Court, ensured "that defendants cannot escape the reach of statutes by delib-
erately shielding themselves from clear evidence of critical facts that are
strongly suggested by the circumstances."8 6 In the criminal context, the will-
ful blindness standard required proof of the defendant's subjective belief
"that there is a high probability that a fact exists," and that the defendant
took "deliberate actions to avoid learning of that fact."" Without any discus-
sion of how such a standard belongs in patent infringement cases, the Court
simply referenced "the long history of willful blindness and its wide ac-
ceptance in the Federal Judiciary."I'
In doing so, the Court explicitly rejected the use of recklessness and
negligence-standards typically seen in civil cases-to prove an alleged
inducer's mental state.89 The Court also clearly "appeal[ed] to moral theory
by citing the 'traditional rationale' that willfully blind defendants 'are just
as culpable as those who have actual knowledge.' "90 As Justice Kennedy,
the lone dissenter, reminded the majority, this reasoning betrays the idea
that moral purposes, such as retribution, "have no force in the domain of
patent law."91
There should be little confusion after Global-Tech: (1) knowledge of the
asserted patent is required to prove induced infringement under 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(b);92 and (2) the quantum of knowledge required for such proof is
either the criminal concept of willful blindness or actual knowledge.93 Glob-
al-Tech also decidedly rejected previous formulations of knowledge derived
84. Id. This may seem like a thin reed on which the Court hung its decision regarding
whether induced infringement requires knowledge of the accused patent. The provisions have
little overlapping language, have existed as separate statutes for over sixty years, and seem, in
principle, to remedy different harms. As such, whatever stare decisis is due, the Court's juris-
prudence on contributory infringement should have no bearing on issues of first impression
regarding induced infringement, no matter how late-coming they may be.
85. Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2068.
86. Id. at 2068-69.
87. Id. at 2070.
88. Id. at 2069.
89. Id. at 2070-71.
90. Id. at 2072 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 2073.
92. Id. at 2068 (majority opinion).
93. Id.
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from civil law concepts as described by the district court94 and the Federal
Circuit."
This importation of criminal mens rea into the patent statute calls for
the reexamination of mental states in the law generally. The traditional goals
of criminal law (including moral condemnation, retribution, and rehabilita-
tion) are far different than the traditional goals of patent law (such as the
"Progress of Science and useful Arts,"'96 allowing inventors to recoup the
costs of their invention, and clearly demarcating intellectual property lines).
Parts II and III below explain and compare the different purposes of mental
states in criminal and patent law.
II. THE PURPOSE OF MENs REA IN CRIMINAL LAW
As a general matter, all crimes are defined by two components: a bad
physical act, the "actus reus," and a bad mental state possessed by the de-
fendant while committing the bad act, the "mens rea." 97 "The existence of a
mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-
American criminal jurisprudence."98 This rule applies both to common law
and purely statutory crimes. 9 Even where a purely statutory crime is silent
as to mens rea, long-standing jurisprudential and philosophical concerns
counsel courts to read one into the statute.'0o
94. SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., No. 99 Civ. 9284, 2007 WL 3165783, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2007) (finding that SEB possessed "specific intent" to induce infringement).
95. SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 594 F.3d 1360, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (find-
ing that SEB was "deliberate[ly] indifferen[t]" to whether induced infringement had
occurred).
96. U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
97. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 148 (2007) ("[T]he general principle [is] that
where scienter is required no crime is committed absent the requisite state of mind."); United
States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 131 (1980) ("In the criminal law, both a culpable mens rea
and a criminal actus reus are generally required for an offense to occur."); Morissette v. United
States, 342 U.S. 246, 251-52 (1952) ("Crime, as a compound concept, generally constituted
only from concurrence of an evil-meaning mind with an evil-doing hand . . . .").
98. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 500 (1951); see also United States v. U.S.
Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436 (1978) (quoting Dennis); Staples v. United States, 511 U.S.
600, 605 (1994) (quoting U.S. Gypsum).
99. Staples, 511 U.S. at 605 (citing United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 251 (1922)).
100. Id. at 606 (discussing other cases reading a mens rea requirement into a silent stat-
ute); see also Morissette, 342 U.S. at 250 ("The contention that an injury can amount to a
crime only when inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient notion. It is as universal
and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the human will and a conse-
quent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between good and evil.").
The exception to this rule is when the statute "regulate[s] potentially harmful or injurious
items" such that the crime is characterized as a "public welfare" offense. Staples, 511 U.S. at
607. "In such situations, we have reasoned that as long as a defendant knows that he is dealing
with a dangerous device of a character that places him in responsible relation to a public dan-
ger, he should be alerted to the probability of strict regulation, and we have assumed that in
such cases Congress intended to place the burden on the defendant to ascertain at his peril
whether his conduct comes within the inhibition of the statute." Id. (internal quotation marks
11IFall 2012]
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Historically, there have been three principal functions of the mens rea
requirement: (1) to ascribe a level of moral blameworthiness to a defendant
who commits a particular act,' 0 (2) to differentiate between those acts re-
quiring private compensation (torts) as opposed to societal retribution
(crimes),102 and (3) "to shield people against punishment for apparently in-
nocent activity." 03 Concepts, terms, and phrases describing particular
degrees of mental states have arisen to further these goals.'" As such, the
terms employed by statutes and courts to define criminally culpable mental
states have become embodied with specific and sometimes unique meanings
in relation to the function they seek to further.
and alterations omitted). A public-welfare-offense statute, therefore, "dispenses with the con-
ventional requirement for criminal conduct-awareness of some wrongdoing." Id. at 606-07.
101. See, e.g., Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 156 ("A critical facet of the individualized
determination of culpability required in capital cases is the mental state with which the de-
fendant commits the crime. Deeply ingrained in our legal tradition is the idea that the more
purposeful is the criminal conduct, the more serious is the offense, and, therefore, the more
severely it ought to be punished."); Michael S. Moore, Prima Facie Moral Culpability, 76
B.U. L. REV. 319, 319-20 (1996) ("Culpability focuses on the actor, not on the act on which
wrongdoing focuses. More specifically, culpability focuses on the actor's mental state at the
time of the wrongful act. Roughly, one is culpable if he chooses to do wrong in circumstances
when that choice is freely made.").
102. See, e.g., Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between
Criminal and Civil Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1795, 1806 n.36 (1992) ("[M]ost criminal cases re-
quire proof of subjective and objective liability, whereas most civil cases require proof only of
objective liability. Therefore, we say that the paradigmatic task of the civil law is to compen-
sate for damages caused in the normal conduct of everyday life, usually without regard to
actual knowledge or intent."); Jacqueline E. Ross, What Makes Sentencing Facts Controver-
sial? Four Problems Obscured by One Solution, 47 VILL. L. REv. 965, 978 (2002) ("The
mental state of the accused matters because criminal liability, unlike tort liability, envisages
punishment of the perpetrator rather than compensation of the victim."); Pamela S. Karlan,
Note, Discriminatory Purpose and Mens Rea: The Tortured Argument of Invidious Intent, 93
YALE L.J. 111, 116-17 (1983) ("[T]he intent requirement in [civil] equal protection cases
should be less stringent than that employed in criminal prosecutions" because "criminal law
does not attempt to restore victims to the position they occupied before the commission of the
crime; rather, it leaves such attempts to civil tort actions or victim compensation statutes.").
103. Staples, 511 U.S. at 622 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); see also, e.g., Carter v. United
States, 530 U.S. 255, 269 (2000) ("The presumption in favor of scienter requires a court to
read into a statute only that mens rea which is necessary to separate wrongful conduct from
otherwise innocent conduct.") (internal quotation marks omitted); Morissette, 342 U.S. at 252
("By use or combination of these various [levels of mens rea, courts] have sought to protect
those who were not blameworthy in mind from conviction of infamous common-law
crimes.").
104. See Morissette, 342 U.S. at 252 ("The unanimity with which [courts] have adhered
to the central thought that wrongdoing must be conscious to be criminal is emphasized by the
variety, disparity and confusion of their definitions of the requisite but elusive mental element.
However, courts of various jurisdictions, and for the purposes of different offenses, have de-
vised working formulae, if not scientific ones, for the instruction of juries around such terms
as 'felonious intent,' 'criminal intent,' 'malice aforethought,' 'guilty knowledge,' 'fraudulent
intent,' 'wilfulness,' 'scienter,' to denote guilty knowledge, or 'mens rea,' to signify an evil
purpose or mental culpability.").
[Vol. 19:1
Patent Infringement as Criminal Conduct
A. Ascribing Moral Blameworthiness
"The normal purpose of the criminal law is to condemn and punish
conduct that society regards as immoral.""o' But not all acts, equal in
harm, are equally immoral. A driver, for example, who accidentally kills a
pedestrian, through no fault of his own, is not as morally culpable as a
driver who intentionally runs someone down. 06 Similarly, there is a moral
gap between a defendant involuntarily striking a person versus intentional-
ly hitting him,107 between taking property he thought to be abandoned
versus absconding with his neighbor's,10 and even between unwittingly
distributing child pornography versus doing so while knowing it to be
such.'0
Indeed, the more restrictive the mens rea, the more morally culpable
the crime. The Model Penal Code's treatment of criminal homicide serves
as a particularly good example of this principle. Although all involve the
"death of another human being," the Model Penal Code divides criminal
homicide into three separate crimes: murder, manslaughter, and negligent
homicide."s0 Murder is homicide committed "purposely," "knowingly," or
"recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the
value of human life.""' Manslaughter is homicide committed "recklessly"
105. United States v. Marvin, 687 F.2d 1221, 1226 (8th Cir. 1982); see also United
States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971) ("[B]ecause of the seriousness of criminal penalties,
and because criminal punishment usually represents the moral condemnation of the communi-
ty, legislatures and not courts should define criminal activity."); cf 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)
(2011) (asking federal judges to take into account, during sentencing, concerns substantially
grounded in moral theory: the need "to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote re-
spect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense").
106. See Mitchell N. Berman & Ian P. Farrell, Provocation Manslaughter as Partial
Justification and Partial Excuse, 52 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1027, 1075 (2011) ("[A] murder
conviction expresses a greater degree of moral condemnation than a conviction for manslaugh-
ter."); Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, The New Imperialism: Violence, Norms, and the "Rule of
Law," 101 MICH. L. REv. 2275, 2316-17 (2003) ("Auto accidents and felony murders repre-
sent, specifically, a decision to assign different kinds of moral meaning to different kinds of
violence and suffering.").
107. See People v. Grant, 46 Ill. App. 3d 125, 129-130 (1977) (reversing jury conviction
where defendant argued that the act was the result of a "psychomotor epileptic seizure");
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01 explanatory note (2001) ("[Tihe fundamental predicate for all
criminal liability, that the guilt of the defendant be based upon conduct, and that the conduct
include a voluntary act.").
108. See Morissette, 342 U.S. at 276 (concluding that a defendant could not be convicted
for taking shell casings from a federal bombing range, in violation of a statute prohibiting the
theft of U.S. government property, where he innocently thought the shell casings to be aban-
doned).
109. See United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 71-73 (1994) (conclud-
ing that because "the age of the performers is the crucial element separating legal innocence
from wrongful conduct,' the statute prohibiting trafficking in child pornography must be read
to require a minimal scienter that the trafficked goods are child porn).
110. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.1.
Ill. Id.§210.2.
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or "under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for
which there is reasonable explanation or excuse."ll 2 And negligent homi-
cide is "[c]riminal homicide . . . when it is committed negligently"" 3 (i.e.,
"when he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk")." 4 Be-
cause the result is the same for all three crimes-the "death of
another"" 5-the only difference is the degree of mens rea of the defend-
ant. This principle that mens rea defines the moral depravity of the crime
is not uniquely attributable to the simplification and "uniformization"
functions of the Model Penal Code, but has been traced to various histori-
cal sources, including American principles of individualism,1 6 theories of
law and economics," 7 and nature."'
Therefore, the mens rea attached to a crime measures the particular
level of moral culpability wished to be ascribed to a guilty defendant." 9
And to the extent that morality is a widely varied notion, there exist a me-
nagerie of colorful phrases defining differing levels of guilt. The Supreme
Court commented on this variety in Morissette v. United States:
Courts, with little hesitation or division, found an implication of
the requirement as to offenses that were taken over from the
common law. The unanimity with which they have adhered to the
central thought that wrongdoing must be conscious to be criminal
is emphasized by the variety, disparity and confusion of their def-
initions of the requisite but elusive mental element. However,
courts of various jurisdictions, and for the purposes of different
offenses, have devised working formulae, if not scientific ones,
for the instruction of juries around such terms as "felonious in-
tent," "criminal intent," "malice aforethought," "guilty
knowledge," "fraudulent intent," "wilfulness," "scienter," to de-
note guilty knowledge, or "mens rea," to signify an evil purpose
or mental culpability.120
112. Id. § 210.3.
113. Id. § 210.4.
114. Id. § 210.2.
115. Id. § 210.1.
116. United States v. Morissette, 342 U.S. 246, 251-52 (1952) ("Crime, as a com-
pound concept, generally constituted only from concurrence of an evil-meaning mind with
an evil-doing hand, was congenial to an intense individualism and took deep and early root
in American soil.").
117. Jeffrey S. Parker, The Economics of Mens Rea, 79 VA. L. REV. 741, 774-77 (1993).
118. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 3 ("Even a dog distinguishes
between being stumbled over and being kicked.").
119. See Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 643 (1991) ("If, then, two mental states are
supposed to be equivalent means to satisfy the mens rea element of a single offense, they must
reasonably reflect notions of equivalent blameworthiness or culpability, whereas a difference
in their perceived degrees of culpability would be a reason to conclude that they identified
different offenses altogether.").
120. Morissette, 342 U.S. at 252.
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A few specific examples reinforce the notion that the kaleidoscopic
legal terminology surrounding mental states displays a complex, nuanced
picture of moral culpability. Perhaps the most widely studied of these ex-
amples, the old common law murder standard of "the unlawful killing of
another human being with malice aforethought,"'2 1 arose as specifically
tailored to implicate a particular degree of the defendant's moral culpabil-
ity: not "necessarily ... any special malevolence towards the individual
slain, but ... of [the defendant's] depraved, wicked, and malicious spirit, a
heart regardless of social duty, and a mind deliberately bent on mis-
chief."l22 This standard of "malice" did not carry over into other common
law conceptions of murder where the defendant, even though he was fac-
tually guilty of the killing, possessed a slightly lesser moral culpability.12 3
This kaleidoscopic view of criminal states has continued in more modem
statutory crimes, such as the 1934 Securities Exchange Act, which crimi-
nalizes the willful violation of its provisions. Willful in this context,
however, has a particularly elusive-and hotly debated-meaning in de-
scribing securities fraud.124 The appellate courts have alternatively
described it as "knowingly and with intent to deceive"; 2 1 "intentionally
undertaking an act that one knows to be wrongful . .. not [necessarily] that
the actor know specifically that the conduct was unlawful"; 26 and "volun-
tarily, intentionally, and with a specific intent to disregard, to disobey the
law, with a bad purpose to violate the law." 27 Thus, one of the purposes of
criminal mental states is to sketch a specific, nuanced portrait of a particu-
lar level of moral opprobrium.
B. Diferentiating Between Torts and Crimes
Generally, "the paradigmatic task of the civil law is to compensate for
damages caused in the normal conduct of everyday life, usually without
regard to actual knowledge or intent." 8 This is not to say that tort theory
wholly dismisses any aspect of a defendant's mental state: intentional torts
often focus on whether the defendant intended the consequences of his
121. Schad, 501 U.S. at 640 (internal quotation marks omitted).
122. Allen v. United States, 164 U.S.492, 495 (1896).
123. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 226 (1977) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted); see also Schad, 501 U.S. at 644 (casting doubt on whether the mental state required for
felony murder was the equivalent to "premeditation").
124. Michael L. Seigel, Bringing Coherence to Mens Rea Analysis for Securities-Related
Offenses, 2006 Wis. L. REV. 1563, 1580-98 (2006) (discussing the state of, and the debate
concerning, "willfulness" analysis in the securities context).
125. United States v. Kaiser, 609 F.3d 556, 570 (2d Cir. 2010).
126. United States v. Tarallo, 380 F.3d 1174, 1188 (9th Cir. 2004).
127. United States v. Bank of New England, N.A., 821 F2d 844, 855 (1st Cir. 1987); see
also United States v. Faulhaber, 929 F.2d 16, 18-19 (1st Cir. 1991) (applying the definition of
"willfulness" in Bank of New England to securities crimes).
128. Mann, supra note 102, at 1806 n.36.
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act,129 while accidental torts center on whether the defendant's actions fell
below some standard of objective reasonableness.13 0 But civil mental states
are not the same as a criminal defendant's subjective state of belief or de-
sire as to the outcome of his conduct.131 The principle purpose of tort law
is the compensation of damages.'32 And to that end, one function of partic-
ularized concepts of mens rea is to distinguish the morally culpable, and
hence criminally liable, from those who are merely financial responsi-
ble.133
There are numerous and diverse federal statutes that have "criminal
kickers" 34 to civil enforcement provisions, including the Securities Ex-
change Act,3 5 the Sherman Act,136 the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act ("LMRDA"),137 and even the Poultry and Poultry Products
Inspection Act ("PPIA").s38 Each statute premises criminal liability not on
any of the harms underlying the substantive offense but on the existence of
a defendant's particular mens rea.139
Both the Securities Exchange Act and the LMRDA make criminal the
willful violations of their provisions.140 In the securities fraud context, as
discussed, the willful violation of securities laws is the only element sepa-
rating civil and criminal liability.'4 ' Similarly, the Second Circuit, in Unit-
129. Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57,61-62 (1998).
130. See Thomas C. Grey, Accidental Torts, 54 VAND. L. REv. 1225, 1255 (2001) ("An
alternative to the view of negligence as a mental fact, though, was available in standard
definitions given by common law judges. These treated negligence simply as conduct falling
below the standard set by the reasonable man, without any reference to an inadvertent state of
mind.").
131. Kenneth W. Simons, Rethinking Mental States, 72 B.U. L. REV. 463, 482-86 (1992)
(positing that negligence and recklessness are standards of conduct rather than "states of be-
lief" or "states of desire").
132. See Mann, supra note 102, at 1806 n.36.
133. See Karlan, supra note 102, at 1117 ("[Clriminal law does not attempt to restore
victims to the position they occupied before the commission of the crime; rather, it leaves such
attempts to civil tort actions or victim compensation statutes.").
134. Geraldine Szott Moohr, What the Martha Stewart Case Tells Us About White Collar
Criminal law, 43 Hous. L. REV. 591, 600 (2006) (listing the following statutes).
135. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (2011).
136. Id. § 1.
137. 29 U.S.C. § 463(b) (2011). The act is popularly known as the Landrum-Griffin Act.
See Serafinn v. Local 722, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 597 F.3d 908, 910 (7th Cir. 2010).
138. 21 U.S.C. § 461(a) (2011).
139. Moohr, supra note 134, at 600 ("The only distinctions between civil and criminal
liability in many statutes are the defendant's felonious intent, the mens rea element . . . .").
140. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (2011) ("Any person who willfully violates any provision of
[the Securities Exchange Act] . . . shall upon conviction be fined not more than $5,000,000, or
imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both .. . ."); 29 U.S.C. § 463(b) (2011) ("Any person
who willfully violates [the LMRDA] section shall be fined not more than $10,000 or impris-
oned for not more than one year, or both.").
141. See United States v. Cassese, 428 F.3d 92, 98 (2d Cir. 2005) (affirming the district
court's reversal of defendant's conviction where the government failed to prove "willfulness");
Moohr, supra note 134, at 600 (discussing this in the context of the Martha Stewart case).
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United States v. Ottley, reversed a defendant's conviction even where the
evidence of the labor violation was sufficient because the evidence on
willfulness left the court "with an uneasy feeling occasioned by a possibly
confusing charge on the crucial question of criminal intent." 4 2 This hold-
ing consequently separated the standard of criminal intent for a fiduciary
duty from its parallel in a civil action.14 3
The Sherman Act, too, uses a mens rea element-knowingly-to sepa-
rate criminal and civil antitrust liability.'" In United States v. A. Lanoy
Alston, D.M.D., PC., the Government criminally prosecuted, under the
Sherman Act, a group of dentists who successfully petitioned their local
health care companies to increase co-payment fees.145 Though the jury
convicted the defendants, the district court vacated the conviction, and the
Ninth Circuit affirmed.146 Finding that there was scant evidence at trial that
the defendants knowingly violated the antitrust laws, the court stated: "If
the dentists had believed they were only complying with the [companies']
requests, they would have lacked the mens rea necessary for a price-fixing
conspiracy." 47 This mental state, the court concluded, was the difference
between "a dispute normally handled as a civil enforcement matter [and]
the crushing consequences of a criminal conviction." 48
The PPIA establishes two tiers of criminal liability: "knowing" viola-
tions of its provisions, generally punishable by a fine and one year's
imprisonment, and violations with the "intent to defraud," punishable by
three years' imprisonment.149 Otherwise, the PPIA is no more than a strict
liability civil offense.5 0 For this reason, the Seventh Circuit concluded that
it was a "crucial charge ... that [the defendant] knowingly stored [the un-
inspected] products under insanitary conditions," and affirmed the
defendant's conviction where the prosecution put forth significant evi-
dence of the defendant's mental state.'5'
142. United States v. Ottley, 509 F.2d 667, 674 (2d Cir. 1975).
143. Morrissey v. Curran, 650 F.2d 1267, 1274 n.6 (2d Cir. 1981) (discussing the impli-
cations of Ottley in separating the mental states required for criminal and civil liability).
144. See United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 631-32 (1980) (discussing the require-
ment in U.S. Gypsum that criminal Sherman Act violations incorporate a "knowingly" mens
rea); 16 U.S.C. § 1174(a) (2011) ("Any person who knowingly violates any provision of [the
Fur Seals Act] or of any permit or regulation issued thereunder shall, upon conviction, be lined
not more than $20,000 for such violation, or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.").
145. United States v. A. Lanoy Alston, D.M.D., P.C., 974 F.2d 1206, 1207 (9th Cir.
1992).
146. Id. at 1215.
147. Id. at 1213.
148. Id. at 1214.
149. 21 U.S.C. § 461(a) (2011).
150. Michael T. Roberts, Mandatory Recall Authority: A Sensible and Minimalist Ap-
proach to Improving Food Safety, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 563, 567 n.47 (2004).
151. United States v. LaGrou Distrib. Sys., Inc., 466 F.3d 585, 592 (7th Cir. 2006) (em-
phasis added); see also United States v. P&S Foods, Inc., No. S2-4:02 CR 529 (CDP) (DDN),
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In another circumstance, Congress enacted two separate statutes for
criminal and civil liability resulting from the same substantive offense.
Both the Anti-Kickback Act and the Stark Act prohibit physicians from
collecting referral fees if any part of their treatment is funded by a federal
program. 15 2 These statutes generally punish overlapping conduct as "part
of a complex statutory and regulatory scheme."153 The Stark Act, however,
is entirely a civil offense, while the Anti-Kickback Act provides for both
criminal and civil penalties.154 The major, substantive component underly-
ing this difference in penalty structure is that, "[iun contrast, [the] Stark
[Act] is not a criminal statute and contains no scienter element."'55 Apart
from mens rea, courts have struggled to distinguish the conduct as being
more properly pursued as an Anti-Kickback or Stark violation. 56 There-
fore, whether a defendant is criminally as opposed to civilly liable will
solely turn on whether the defendant did so with "intent to induce referrals
or that plaintiff solicited the remuneration in exchange for referrals."' 5 1
These examples all suggest that "[t]he mental state of the accused matters
because criminal liability, unlike tort liability, envisages punishment of the
perpetrator rather than compensation of the victim."'58
C. Shielding the Innocent
Another "purpose of the mens rea requirement [is] to shield people
against punishment for apparently innocent activity."' 59 That is, it estab-
lishes a minimal predicate below which a defendant will not be punished
for conduct that is otherwise not wrongful. This rationale for mens rea
generally does not apply to crimes that are malum in se-where the physi-
cal act is wrongful in itself-because any mens rea merely specifies the
particular level or aspect of wrongfulness society seeks to punish.'6
2003 WL 25735595, at *6 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 25, 2003) (finding that the indictment sufficiently
described the defendant's "intent to defraud").
152. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(1)(A) (2011) (setting forth the Anti-Kickback Act which
prohibits a physician from "referring an individual to a person for the furnishing or arranging
for the furnishing of any item or service for which payment may be made in whole or in part
under a Federal health care program"); Id. § 1395nn(a)(1)(A) (prohibiting a physician from
"mak[ing] a referral ... for the furnishing of designated health services for which payment
otherwise may be made under [the Stark Act]").
153. Feldstein v. Nash Cmty. Health Servs., Inc., 51 F Supp. 2d 673, 680 (E.D.N.C.
1999) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
154. Id. at 687.
155. Id.
156. See id. (stating that although the two statutes appeared to punish the same conduct,
"[t]he fact remains, however, that both statutes exist, and both should be given meaning if
possible").
157. Id. at 684.
158. Ross, supra note 102, at 978.
159. Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 622 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
160. See supra Part II.A.
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Where the innocent, physical act is mala prohibita, however, a mens rea
threshold "avoids criminalizing apparently innocent conduct."l 6'
In Staples v. United States, the Supreme Court considered whether a
defendant charged with possession of an unregistered machine gun could
challenge his indictment by claiming that he was ignorant of the gun's na-
ture.'62 The operative statute, 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d),163 punished possessing
an unregistered, automatic weapon with ten years' imprisonment,'" but was
silent on the issue of intent.'65 At trial, the defendant did not contest that the
weapon was not registered, but asserted that he was ignorant that it could
be fired automatically.166 The Court agreed with the defendant, and re-
versed his conviction.'16 Concluding that the "long tradition of widespread
lawful gun ownership by private individuals in this country"' 8 made gun
ownership an otherwise lawful activity, the Court reasoned that even a con-
gressional statute silent on mens rea must not have meant to dispose of one
entirely.169 It consequently added a mens rea element of knowingly to the
type of gun ownership. This minimal level of mens rea freed "law-abiding,
well-intentioned citizens [from] a possible ten-year term of imprison-
ment."7 0
The Court did much the same in Liparota v. United States concerning
the use of food stamps.' 7' There, the Court concluded that the statute's
prohibition on the use of food stamps "in any manner not authorized by
[law]" 72 must also include an element of the defendant's knowledge. 7 3
Because purchasing and possessing food stamps was an otherwise inno-
cent activity, a strict liability regime for their misuse would "criminalize a
broad range of apparently innocent conduct," including "us[ing] stamps to
161. Staples, 511 U.S. at 622 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
162. Id. at 602 (majority opinion).
163. 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) (2011).
164. Staples, 511 U.S. at 616.
165. Id. at 605.
166. Id. at 603.
167. Id. at 620.
168. Id. at 610.
169. Id. at 615-16. The Supreme Court also disposed of two arguments asserted by the
United States. First, that because their purpose is to regulate inherently dangerous devices,
federal gun regulations should be deemed to have purposely left out any element of mens rea
in an effort to bring such statutes within the ambit of strict liability "public welfare offenses."
Id. at 606-07; see supra note 100. Second, the defendant should have been generally aware of
gun registration requirements. Staples, 511 U.S. at 608-09. The Court dismissed the former
given the long tradition of American ownership of guns, unlike other articles more typically in
the category of public welfare commodities, such as hand grenades or narcotics. Id. at 612.
The Court dismissed the latter by giving examples of the relative ease of gun ownership in
many states as disproving the notion that gun-owners, as a collective lot, should be well-
versed in federal gun regulations. Id. at 614 n.9.
170. Id. at 615 (quoting United States v. Anderson, 885 F.2d 1248, 1254 (5th Cir. 1989)).
171. Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985).
172. Id. at 427.
173. Id. at 425-26.
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purchase food from a store that, unknown to him, charged higher than
normal prices to food-stamp-program participants." 74 A contrary holding
would have done nothing to "strike[] the appropriate balance between the
legislature, the prosecutor, and the court in defining criminal liability." 75
The Second Circuit followed course in United States v. Bronx Rep-
tiles, Inc.176 concerning the Lacey Act, which prohibits "any person [from]
. .. knowingly ... caus[ing] or permit[ing] any wild animal or bird to be
transported to the United States, or any Territory or district thereof, under
inhumane or unhealthful conditions."' 7 7 The court concluded that the
knowledge element of the statute required a defendant charged under the
Lacey Act to be aware of the "inhumane or unhealthful conditions" of the
transported wild animal because "'[i]n many, if not most, circumstances,
it is perfectly innocent' for a person knowingly to cause or permit the
transportation of a wild animal or bird to the United States." 78 This view
of mens rea as a floor to the criminal regulation of conduct at least "en-
sure[s] that persons subject to conviction ... will have committed a
minimally blameworthy act." 79
III. THE PURPOSE OF INTENT IN PATENT LAW
A patent is little more than a legal right to exclude others from mak-
ing, using, selling, or offering to sell one's invention.s 0 It is, in essence, a
monopoly over a particular invention."' The Constitution urges Congress
to provide inventors such monopolies "to promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts,"'8 2 and, more specifically, enables Congress to encourage
invention by allowing inventors the opportunity to recoup their research
174. Id. at 426.
175. Id. at 427.
176. United States v. Bronx Reptiles, Inc., 217 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 2000).
177. 18 U.S.C. § 42(c) (2011).
178. Bronx Reptiles, 217 F.3d at 88 (quoting United States v. Figueroa, 165 F.3d 111,
I16 (2d Cir. 1998)) (internal citations omitted).
179. See Stephen F. Smith, Proportional Mens Rea, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 127, 131-32
(2009).
180. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392 (2006) ("[T]he Patent
Act also declares that 'patents shall have the attributes of personal property,' [35 U.S.C.]
§ 261, including 'the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling
the invention,' [35 U.S.C.] § 154(a)(1).").
181. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229 (1964) ("The grant of a
patent is the grant of a statutory monopoly ... not given as favors, as was the case of monopo-
lies given by the Tudor monarchs, ... but are meant to encourage invention by rewarding the
inventor with the right, limited to a term of years fixed by the patent, to exclude others from
the use of his invention.").
182. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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and development costs.' 83 The exchange for such an expansive right is the
public disclosure of the invention.184
When another violates an inventor's monopoly, the inventor's sole legal
recourse is a federal patent infringement action under 35 U.S.C. § 271.'18
No state-law causes of action exist because patent law is exclusively a fed-
eral domain.'86 Nor are there any separate common law causes of action
because the federal infringement statute, § 271, has swallowed common law
theories of infringement by codification.'87 And although a patent has many
attributes of a federal property grant,'88 there is no administrative procedure
for violations by a private party.'89
Generally, there are three types of patent infringement: direct
infringement under § 271(a), induced infringement under § 271(b) (as in
Global-Tech), and contributory infringement under § 271(c). Direct
infringement, as a strict liability offense, does not have a mental state
requirement.190 Induced infringement, prior to Global-Tech, required mere
constructive knowledge-less akin to a criminal mental state than an objective
standard.'' And contributory infringement's mental state requirement is
183. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974) ("The patent laws
promote this progress by offering a right of exclusion for a limited period as an incentive to
inventors to risk the often enormous costs in terms of time, research, and development."); John
M. Golden, Principles for Patent Remedies, 88 TEx. L. REv. 505, 517 (2010) ("Under a stand-
ard economic understanding, the basic purpose of a patent is to enable a rights holder to price
above marginal cost so that the rights holder has a greater opportunity to recoup costs of de-
veloping or disseminating the invention.").
184. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 224 (2003) ("Complete disclosure as a precondi-
tion to the issuance of a patent is part of the quid pro quo that justifies the limited monopoly
for the inventor as consideration for full and immediate access by the public when the limited
time expires.").
Because public disclosure further promotes scientific progress by aiding additional in-
vention in the field, the patent system--on the whole-appears to fulfill its constitutional
mandate in two ways.
185. Section 271 defines infringement while § 281 creates a cause of action. See 35
U.S.C. § 281 (2011) ("A patentee shall have remedy by civil action for infringement of his
patent.").
186. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 155 (1989) (holding
that federal law preempts state law causes of action for patent infringement).
187. See NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
("Section 271(a) was merely a codification of the common law of infringement that had de-
veloped up to the time of passage of the 1952 Patent Act. It was not meant to change the law
of infringement." (citing Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 530 n.10
(1972))).
188. See 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2011) ("[Platents shall have the attributes of personal proper-
ty").
189. Cf Ellen P. Goodman, Spectrum Rights in the Telecosm to Come, 41 SAN DIEGO L.
REv. 269, 286-97 (2004) (discussing disputes between private parties over electromagnetic
spectrum licenses); S. Paul Margie, Can You Hear Me Now? Getting Better Reception from the
FCC's Spectrum Policy, 2004 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 5 (2004) (discussing the FCC's adminis-
trative procedures to resolve licensing disputes).
190. See infra Part Ill.A.
191. See supra Part I.
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limited to the accused infringer knowing that a component is especially
made to operate in an infringing manner.192 None, however, are concerned
with the purposes of criminal mental state requirements: ascribing moral
culpability, differentiating torts from crimes, or shielding the innocent.
Rather, the presence and absence of mental state elements in infringement
actions serve to facilitate patent holders in obtaining damages for
infringement of their patents. The sections below discuss each type of
infringement and the presence or absence of a mental state requirement.
A. Direct Infringement
Section 271(a) lists the acts constituting direct infringement: "whoever
without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention,
within the United States, or imports into the United States any patented in-
vention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent." 93 Direct
infringement is notable for its lack of a mental state requirement: it is a strict
liability offense.' 94 As such, direct infringement does not focus on any sense
of morality or retribution or rehabilitation, but solely on the civil economic
redress of the patent holder. The remedies for direct infringement demon-
strate this focus, whether they are for retrospective or prospective relief.'95
For claims of past infringement, a patent holder is limited to monetary re-
lief.9 6 For claims seeking to prevent future infringement, a patent holder
may demand either injunctive or monetary relief.'97 In either event, the pur-
pose of the patent infringement action is to either compensate the owner of a
patent for the unauthorized use of an infringer,"- or to delay the entry of a
competitor in the market place.' 99 It largely-if not entirely-crafts econom-
ic remedies in response to economic harms.
This stands in contrast to other causes of action for property violations.
Traditionally, the ownership of real property had a moral component. 200
192. See infra Part II.C.
193. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2011).
194. See In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc) ("Be-
cause patent infringement is a strict liability offense, the nature of the offense is only relevant
in determining whether enhanced damages are warranted.").
195. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392 (2006) (discussing the
case where patent holder sued for damages for past infringement and an injunction to prevent
future infringement).
196. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2011) (authorizing damages of "in no event less than a rea-
sonable royalty"); ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 594 F.3d 860, 868-69 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
197. See eBay, 547 U.S. at 391.
198. See Riles v. Shell Exploration & Prod. Co., 298 F.3d 1302, 1312-13 (Fed. Cir.
2002).
199. See Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust and Patent Law as Component Parts of Innova-
tion Policy, 34 J. CORP. L. 1259, 1273 (2009).
200. See generally Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1849 (2007) (discussing the intersection between morality and proper-
ty).
22 [Vol. 19:1
Patent Infringement as Criminal Conduct
From a constitutional perspective, "the overriding respect for the sanctity of
the home ... has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Re-
public."201 Fourteenth Amendment due process protects property alongside
such weighty ideals as "life" and "liberty."202 This moral focus on property
ownership makes common law trespass actions actionable even if no econom-
ic harm was felt by the owner.203 This remains true today even in a world
where calls for a "cost-justification" approach to trespass have become in-
creasingly vehement. 204 in a famous case, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
awarded a trespass victim $1 in nominal damages but $100,000 in punitive
damages.205 One commentator has described the opinion as "one of quiet
outrage."206
Nuisance-another common law cause of action for property viola-
tions-has similarly incorporated aspects of morality, as well as
utilitarianism.2 07 The Second Restatement of Torts, for example, defines an
"unreasonable" nuisance as an activity where "the gravity of the harm out-
weighs the utility of the actor's conduct, or ... the harm caused by the
conduct is serious and the financial burden of compensating for [it] ...
would not make the continuation of the conduct not feasible."2 08 The Su-
preme Court adopted this mixed approach in a takings case to determine
whether the plaintiff's proposed use of his land to build homes constituted a
nuisance, as asserted by the State of South Carolina.2" Rather than deferring
to South Carolina's assertion, the Court required an inquiry into "the degree
of harm to public lands and resources, . . . the social value of the claimant's
activities and their suitability to the locality in question, and the relative ease
with which the alleged harm can be avoided through measures taken by the
claimant and the government (or adjacent private landowners) alike." 10
Countless pieces of legal scholarship have prescribed such a flexible ap-
proach.211
201. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 601 (1980).
202. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
203. See Eric R. Claeys, Jefferson Meets Coase: Land-Use Torts, Law and Economics,
and National Property Rights, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1379, 1406 (2010).
204. See Ben Deporter, Fair Trespass, Ill COLUM. L. REV. 1090, 1090-95 (2011) (call-
ing trepass "a seemingly tranquil and uncomplicated backwater of property law," and
discussing the ossification of strict liability trespass doctrine).
205. Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154 (1997). At the time of writing,
the case has already been cited by ninety-two law review articles.
206. See Merril & Smith, supra note 200, at 1872.
207. See Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and Its Utilitarian Con-
strains, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 49, 77-79 (1979).
208. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826 (1965).
209. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030-31 (1992).
210. Id. (internal citations omitted).
211. E.g., Albert C. Lin, Deciphering the Chemical Soup: Using Public Nuisance to
Compel Chemical Testing, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 955, 994-95 (2010) (proposing nuisance
theory in response to "chemical manufacturers' failure to test their products ... [for] its sim-
plicity and relatively flexible application"); J.B. Ruhl, Making Nuisance Ecological, 58 CASE
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But direct infringement actions are not flexible. They neither weigh the
gravity of harms, nor measure the financial burden of compensation, nor
balance these concerns with the "wrongness" of the defendant's conduct.
Direct infringement actions are therefore strict liability offenses divorced
from both morality and public utility.212 Perhaps the best example of direct
infringement's rejection of utilitarianism is the set of E-91 I cases filed by
patent-holding company EMSAT Advanced Geo-Location Technology,
LLC."' In these cases, EMSAT sued a number of cellular service providers,
such as AT&T, Sprint, and T-Mobile,214 for infringing a patent that claimed a
"cellular communication system," which "forward[ed an] exact geographic
location and specific mobile unit identification for use in subsequent ser-
vices."2 15 EMSAT claimed that the providers infringed its patent when they
forwarded the geographic location of its users to local law enforcement au-
thorities during 911 calls-that is, that the cell phone companies infringed
its patent by allowing their users to call 911 in an emergency. 216 It seems fair
to say that the equities favor the cell phone companies: the ability of a cell
phone user to call for help in a life-or-death emergency should morally
trump an intellectual property right. It seems probable that whatever public
utility is gained by certainty in clearly demarcated property rights is offset
by the disutility of the lack of mobile phone access to first responders. But
these concerns simply do not figure in these cases because there is no ave-
nue for them to be litigated.
Furthermore, direct infringement actions are not subject to the tradition-
al sort of equitable property defenses. There is no "good faith" exception to
patent infringement. An accused infringer who manifested a "good faith
belief' that he had proper license to the asserted patent cannot escape liabil-
W. RES. L. REV. 753, 783 (2008) (suggesting the creation of common law causes of action for
environmental nuisances as "flexible, innovative, and responsive"); Steven Kam, Note, Intel
Corp. v. Hamidi: Trespass to Chattels and a Doctrine of Cyber-Nuisance, 19 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 427, 428 (2004) (suggesting the creation of a nuisance "cyber-tort" akin to the trespass of
chattels).
212. See In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc) ("Be-
cause patent infringement is a strict liability offense, the nature of the offense is only relevant
in determining whether enhanced damages are warranted.").
213. E.g., EMSAT Advanced Geo-Location Tech., LLC v. AT&T Mobility LLC, No. 08-
cv-822 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 31, 2008); EMSAT Advanced Geo-Location Tech., LLC v. Sprint
Spectrum, LP, No. 08-cv-818 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 31, 2008); EMSAT Advanced Geo-Location
Tech., LLC v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 08-cv-817 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 31, 2008).
In the interest of disclosure, I represented T-Mobile in its case against EMSAT.
214. See supra note 213.
215. U.S. Patent No. 7,289,763, col. 171. 43-56 (filed Nov. 22, 2004).
216. See, e.g., Third Amended Complaint for Patent Infringement at I 11-18, EMSAT
Advanced Geo-Location Technology, LLC v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 2011 WL 843205 (N.D.
Ohio Mar. 8, 2011) (No. 08-cv-817).
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ity.217 Patent law also does not contain a "fair use" doctrine.218 "[W]hoever
without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention"
is liable for patent infringement, 2 9 regardless as to the quantity or quality of
the infringing activity. 220 Even the common law "research exemption,"
which inoculated a defendant from infringement liability if the defendant's
activities were "solely for research, academic or experimental purposes," 2 2 1
has mostly been eliminated after Madey v. Duke University.222 Now, a de-
fendant facing a claim of patent infringement must prove that its allegedly
infringing activity was "for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strict-
ly philosophical inquiry" that does not have "definite, cognizable, and not
insubstantial commercial purposes."2 3 The Federal Circuit has not upheld a
finding of noninfringement based on the research exemption since Madey.
Contrasted with other forms of civil redress, the Federal Circuit's focus in
Madey is purely economic-just as in direct infringement actions.
B. Induced Infringement
Subsection (b) of the infringement statute makes liable "[w]hoever ac-
tively induce[d] infringement of a patent,"224 that is, those who "aided and
abetted another's direct infringement of the patent."225 This language, "aid
and abet," and the Supreme Court's decision in Global-Tech, may appear to
suggest that the purpose of the "actively induce" language is the same as
that for criminal accessory. But actions for infringement-by-inducement do
not seek to stamp a moral imprimatur on the underlying activity; the Federal
Circuit has rejected the notion that inducement places any moral weight on
the allegations of direct infringement. In Rodime PLC v. Seagate Technolo-
gies, Inc., the court compared the plaintiff's infringement-by-inducement
claims to its unfair competition claims, and noted that "[ilnducement re-
quires no proof that the acts underlying the inducement are 'wrongful' by
some measure other than the fact of the inducement itself."26 This contrasts
217. Filtroil, N.A. v. Maupin, 20 F. App'x 834, 840 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Note, however, that
such a good faith belief may prevent the plaintiff from collecting enhanced damages under 35
U.S.C. § 285. See id.
218. See Soitec, S.A. v. Silicon Genesis Corp., 81 F. App'x 734, 737 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
("There is no fair use or research and development exception for infringement of normal
commercial processes."). See generally Maureen A. O'Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use
in Patent Law, 100 COLum. L. REV. 1177 (2000) (discussing the lack of a fair use doctrine in
patent law).
219. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2011).
220. See O'Rourke, supra note 218, at 1205 n. 118 (discussing this contrast between
patent and copyright law).
221. Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
222. Id. at 1361-63.
223. Id. at 1361-62.
224. 35 U.S.C. § 27 1(b) (2011).
225. See Rodime PLC v. Seagate Tech., Inc., 174 F.3d 1294, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
226. Id.
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greatly with "aiding and abetting" or "accessory" liability in the criminal
context where the underlying activity must be made "wrongful," either by
statute or by traditional common law principles.227
The difference between infringement-by-inducement and criminal ac-
cessory liability is further contrasted by their differing scopes of liability.
Under federal law, the principal need not be convicted of any crime for an
accessory to be criminally liable. 2 8 Even where the principal has been af-
firmatively acquitted, an accessory can be found guilty of aiding and
abetting a "crime" committed by a legally innocent defendant.229 Not so for
inducement claims, where "[i]t is well settled that there can be no induce-
ment of infringement without direct infringement by some party."230 in
ACCO Brands, Inc. v. ABA Locks Manufacturers Co., the Federal Circuit
overturned a jury verdict of induced infringement because the patent holder
did not prove "specific instances of direct infringement or show that the ac-
cused device necessarily infringes the patent in suit."231 Inducement,
therefore, is not a moral device but a tool concerned with providing eco-
nomic recovery against "upstream" infringers.
Indeed, without inducement, the patent holder "is left with the poten-
tially enormous burden of proceeding against the numerous direct
infringers who purchased the copied product."23 2 This becomes especially
important in cases where the direct infringers themselves are either too
numerous233 or too "shallow-pocketed" 234 to be sued-most notably in the
corporation-inducer/consumer-infringer context. 235 This was precisely the
227. See Dennis J. Baker, The Moral Limits of Criminalizing Remote Harms, 10 NEW
CRIM. L. REv. 370, 371-75 (2007) (discussing "critical morality" in the context of accomplice
liability).
228. Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 15-18 (1980).
229. Id.
230. See Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal Indus., Inc., I F App'x 879,
882 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
231. ACCO Brands, Inc. v. ABA Locks Mfr. Co., 501 F.3d 1307, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
232. Mixing Equip. Co. v. Innova-Tech, Inc., No. 85-535, 1986 WL 14541, at *3 (E.D.
Pa. Dec. 19, 1986).
233. See, e.g., AstraZeneca LP v. Apotex, Inc., 633 F.3d 1042, 1049 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(affirming district court's grant of a preliminary injunction against the generic-drug manufac-
turer defendant for infringement-by-inducement, where defendant's label "would lead many
users to directly infringe the asserted method claims" of the patent-at-issue).
234. See, e.g., Mike's Train House, Inc. v. Broadway Ltd. Imps., No. JKB-09-2657, 2011
WL 856306, at *2-3 (D. Md. Mar. 8, 2011) (concluding that patent-holder's complaint was
sufficient where it sought recovery against the inducer because the direct infringer "has few
employees and few, if any, assets").
235. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Actavis Elizabeth LLC, No. 2010-1500, 2011 WL 3235718,
at *9 (Fed. Cir. July 29, 2011) (affirming district court's judgment of infringement-by-
inducement where corporate defendant induced 8-29% of its customers to directly infringe the
asserted patent); AstraZeneca, 633 F.3d at 1049; Lucent Tech., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d
1301, 1322-23 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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Federal Circuit's concern in Ricoh Co. v. Quanta Computer Inc.236 There,
the plaintiff accused the defendant of contributory infringement and induc-
ing the defendant's customers to infringe its CD-burning technology.23 7
Refusing to dismiss the inducement claims, the court noted that it would not
leave the plaintiff with "the only remedy [of suing] end users of the product
for direct infringement."238 Similar to claims for civil copyright infringe-
ment, the court recognized that "it may be impossible to enforce rights in
the protected work effectively against all direct infringers, [making t]he only
practical alternative [going] against the distributor of the copying device for
secondary liability."239 Thus, the purpose of the "actively induce" mental
state in infringement-by-inducement is to afford patent holders broader ave-
nues for economic recovery than would be available through direct
infringement alone. Its focus, like direct infringement, is on economic re-
dress, not moral condemnation or shielding "innocent" upstream infringers.
C. Contributory Infringement
Subsection (c) of the infringement statute, the "contributory infringe-
ment" provision, makes liable whoever "imports into the United States a
component of a [patent] . .. constituting a material part of the invention,
knowing the same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in
an infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or commodity of
commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use."240 Unlike infringe-
ment-by-inducement, contributory infringement requires a mental state:
"knowing [the sold component] to be especially made or especially
adapted for use in an infringement of such patent."241 The Supreme Court in
Aro II long ago held that the contributory infringement's inclusion of the
word "knowing" required the defendant to know both that the sold compo-
nent was part of a patented article and that the end-product would infringe
that patent when combined.242
While the typical purpose of the "knowledge element in criminal law
is to shield innocent defendants from "the crushing consequences of a
criminal conviction," 24 3 there are no such concerns behind the contributory
infringement statute. As stated by former Chief Judge of the Federal Circuit,
236. Ricoh Co. v. Quanta Computer Inc., 550 F3d 1325, 1337-38 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (per
curiam).
237. Id. at 1336.
238. Id. at 1338.
239. Id. (quoting Metro-Goidwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913,
929-30 (2006)).
240. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2011).
241. Id.
242. Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co. (Aro II), 377 U.S. 476, 488
(1964).
243. United States v. A. Lanoy Alston, D.M.D., P.C., 974 F.2d 1206, 1214 (9th Cir.
1992); see also supra Part II.C.
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Giles S. Rich, "[tihat aspect of patent law referred to as contributory in-
fringement is particularly concerned with economics." 2" In Glenayre
Electronics, Inc. v. Jackson, the Federal Circuit discussed this aspect of
contributory infringement, including the rule that damages assessed to a con-
tributory infringer are normally "the same as damages that would be assessed
had the patentee sued and obtained a judgment against the customers."245
Where the plaintiff had already recovered damages in full for the harm he
suffered from the direct infringement of his patent, the Glenayre court prohib-
ited him from collecting additional damages for the arising acts of
contributory infringement. 24 6 This evidences the Federal Circuit's concern
with making plaintiffs economically "whole" rather than separating the guilty
from the innocent. 247 Further, it seems particularly peculiar to import a crimi-
nal knowledge requirement with such a concern where the direct infringement
provisions of the patent statute, so equated with contributory infringement,
unhesitatingly impose strict liability for otherwise innocent offenses. 248
Professor Bartholomew has similarly written about how contributory in-
fringement's "explicitly nonretributive [sic] justification clashes with the moral
basis for criminal punishment of aiders and abettors of crimes."249 "Intellectual
property law differs from general tort law," he writes, "in that it is particularly
concerned with the aggregate effects of a defendant's behavior rather than pre-
cisely identifying who is blameworthy for a particular wrongful act."25 0 The
character of knowledge required to prove contributory infringement should not
evidence a concern with separating the morally guilty from the financially re-
sponsible. Rather, it should allow recovery to those who have any form of
knowledge of their contributorily infringing activities. This better comports
with the economic concerns of contributory infringement voiced by former
Chief Judge Rich and the court in Glenayre. Although Professor Bartholomew
suggests that the purpose of contributory infringement actions are utilitarian
rather than economic 25 '-a point generally contested by this article-he too
244. Giles S. Rich, Contributory Infringement, 14 FED. CIR. B.J. 99, 100 (2004-2005).
245. Glenayre Elecs., Inc. v. Jackson, 444 F.3d 851, 859 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
246. Id. at 860.
247. See id. at 859 ("A patentee who suffers lost profits or loss of royalty income ordi-
narily can be compensated and made whole by the manufacturing infringer. In the usual
course of events, the length of the accused manufacturer's distribution chain should have no
impact on the patentee's ability to be made whole by the manufacturer." (quoting Jerry R.
Selinger & Jessica W. Young, Suing an Infringing Competitor's Customers: Or Life Under the
Single Recovery Rule, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 19, 52 (1997))(intemal alterations omitted)).
248. 35 U.S.C. § 27 1(a) (2011).
249. Mark Bartholomew, Cops, Robbers, and Search Engines: The Questionable Role of
Criminal Law in Contributory Infringement Doctrine, 2009 BYU L. REv. 783, 785.
250. Mark Bartholomew & Patrick F. McArdle, Causing Infringement, 64 VAND. L. REV.
675, 737 (2011).
251. Id. at 736-37.
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has argued for "another organizing principle for contributory infringement,
outside of criminal law."252 It should be so.
D. Willful Infringement
Although no section of the patent statute provides for increased penal-
ties if the infringer's conduct is found to be willful, "a trial court's
discretion in awarding enhanced damages has a long lineage in patent
law."253 This stems from courts' "statutory discretion to enhance damages
for patent infringement [that has been available] since 1836."'254 Until re-
cently, enhanced damages in the patent context have traditionally centered
on whether the defendant acted in "bad faith."255 There, bad faith har-
nessed the moral culpability of the actor. 2 6 The standard was punitive257
and made material the mental state of the offender.2 58
The Federal Circuit, however, jettisoned this decidedly moralistic ap-
proach in In re Seagate Technology, LLC.259 Explicitly overruling its prior
decision in Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 260 Seagate
concluded "that proof of willful infringement permitting enhanced damag-
es requires at least a showing of objective recklessness . .. [and]
abandon[ed] the affirmative duty of due care,"261 previously required in
Underwater Devices. After Seagate, "to establish willful infringement, a
patentee must show by clear and convincing evidence that the infringer
acted despite an objectively high likelihood that its actions constituted
infringement of a valid patent."262
Importantly, Seagate tacked away from the traditional, moralistic
proof previously required to prove willful infringement. The Federal Cir-
cuit ablated any language concerning "bad faith," 263 "culpability,"2 6
252. Bartholomew, supra note 249, at 786.
253. In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc).
254. Id. at 1368 n.3; see also 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2011).
255. Jurgens v. CBK, Ltd., 80 F.3d 1566, 1570-71 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (discussing the ori-
gins of "bad faith infringement").
256. See id.
257. Id. at 1570.
258. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1523 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (en banc) ("Intent becomes a requirement only if and when the patent owner seeks en-
hanced damages or attorney fees for willful infringement.").
259. Seagate, 498 F.3d at 1370-72.
260. Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1983),
overruled by Seagate, 497 F.3d 1360.
261. Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371.
262. Id.
263. Jurgens v. CBK, Ltd., 80 F.3d 1566, 1570-71 (Fed. Cir. 1996). But see Bard Pe-
ripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assoc., 670 F.3d 1171, 1191 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(discussing the factors for determining the amount of damages in a willfulness finding in the
context of assessing "bad faith").
264. Beatrice Foods Co. v. New England Printing & Lithographing Co., 923 F.2d 1576,
1579 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("Under our cases, enhanced damages may be awarded only as a penal-
ty for an infringer's increased culpability, namely willful infringement or bad faith.").
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"motive,"2 65 or "evil intent" from determinations of willful infringe-
ment. 266 Rather, as Seagate acknowledges, "[t]he state of mind of the
accused infringer is not relevant to [the] objective inquiry" required to
prove willfulness. 261 Even with respect to whether the defendant was cog-
nizant of its own actions, Seagate does not necessitate actual knowledge
but only asks whether the risk was "known or so obvious that it should
have been known to the accused infringer."268
Removing the subjective inquiry into a defendant's mental state to
prove willfulness also removes much of the moral culpability associated
with it. In the words of Professor Jason A. Rantanen, Seagate "is, in fact, a
shift downwards from a subjective view of fault toward an objective view,
and thus implicates a lower threshold of fault than previously existed." 269
Seagate condones imposing enhanced damages on the naive: those who
should have known their actions carried an objectively high likelihood of
infringement but did not actually know so. The morally blameless might
nevertheless fall within Seagate's catch. A garage-shop tinkerer who at-
tempts to recreate a known invention without knowing it to be patented, an
industrial chemist who attempts to work around a patent but fails, and a re-
search scientist who mistakenly believes his use of the patented invention
falls within the research exemption might all be liable under Seagate. None
of these actors can be said to possess the evil intent previously inherent in
the law of willful infringement.
This is not to say that willful infringement may not serve a dual pur-
pose: it may also function to punish and deter the truly "bad actors" in the
world of patent infringement. Skeletons of the Federal Circuit's prior moral-
istic approach remain. While Seagate addressed whether an infringer had
violated a patent willfully, the Federal Circuit has continued to rely on some
older, more subjective factors in determining how much a willful infringer is
liable for its act. 270 But even here, these weigh towards an objective stand-
ard. While they include such subjective inquiries as "whether the infringer
deliberately copied the ideas or design of another," and whether the infringer
"formed a good faith belief that [the patent] was invalid or that it was not
265. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1519 (Fed. Cir.
1995) ("[The infringer's] motives and knowledge may affect the question of damages, to swell
or reduce them.) (quoting Parker v. Hulme, 18 F. Cas. 1138, 1143 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1849)
(No. 10,740)).
266. Id.
267. Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371.
268. Id.
269. Jason A. Rantanen, An Objective View of Fault in Patent Infringement, 60 AM. U. L.
REv. 1575, 1608-09 (2011).
270. Spectralytics, Inc. v. Cordis Corp., 649 F.3d 1336, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ("Seagate
removed the presumption of willful infringement flowing from an infringer's failure to exer-
cise due care to avoid infringement, but Seagate did not change the application of the Read
factors with respect to enhancement of damages when willful infringement under § 285 is
found."); see also Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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infringed,"2 7 1 they also include more objective ones, such as "the infringer's
size and financial condition," "the duration of the misconduct," and "the
remedial action by the infringer."272 The subjective, moral inquiry into the
infringer's "state of mind" is thus slight: it is only unearthed after there has
been an objective determination that the infringer acted willfully, and only
in connection with other objective inquiries in assessing exceptional damag-
es. 273
Nonetheless, willful infringement is not based on a purely moral ac-
count. Those who are indifferent to potentially infringing a patent may do so
at an objective risk short of "high," like the garage shop tinkerer mentioned
above. A purely moral account of willful infringement that seeks solely to
punish the wrongdoing of infringement fails to account for willful infringe-
ment that does not also possess an evil intent. The existence of remedies for
willful infringement, whatever its purposes, should not be read as imparting
morality to patent infringement.
IV. PATENT INFRINGEMENT AS CRIMINAL CONDUCT
The differences between the purposes of mental states in criminal and
patent law suggest that they should be treated differently. But Global-Tech
conflates them, requiring courts to adopt a criminal concept of willful blind-
ness into the inducement provision of the infringement statute. This
importation of a criminal mental state into the inducement provision-and
the hastiness with which the Supreme Court did so-creates several prob-
lems. One-importing criminal mental states into the infringement statute
makes it more difficult for patent holders to prove infringement, even when
they have been economically harmed. Two-criminal mental states unrealis-
tically describe a typical infringer's "intent" in patent infringement cases.
And three-the easiness with which the Supreme Court adopted a criminal
mental state in a patent case, wholesale, continues a general and unwise
trend of importing foreign elements into civil law causes of action. Rather
than taking the Supreme Court's approach in Global-Tech, lower courts ex-
amining other areas of civil law should carefully assess the purposes of any
mental state requirements before interpreting them.
A. Importing Criminal Concepts of Mens Rea into the Patent Statute
Disallows Economic Recovery for Legitimately Harmed Plaintiffs
The Court's importation of a criminal concept of willful blindness into
the infringement statute in Global-Tech does nothing to further the econom-
ic goals of inducement liability. Rather, it absolves classes of infringers
271. Spectralytics, 649 F.3d at 1348.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 1349.
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from liability. The point of the willful blindness standard, adopted by the
Court, is to impute actual knowledge of a crime to a defendant to "prevent a
criminal defendant from escaping conviction merely by deliberately closing
his eyes to the obvious risk that he is engaging in unlawful conduct."274 In
this sense it writes a moral gloss onto the normative implication that
"wrong-doers" cannot absolve themselves of criminal responsibility simply
by shutting their eyes to events surrounding them. At the same time, willful
blindness "surpasses recklessness and negligence" 27 -both of which allow
those who are merely risky, stupid, or error-prone to avoid criminal liability
for the same acts. Willful blindness only makes liable "one who takes delib-
erate actions to avoid confirming a high probability of wrongdoing and who
can almost be said to have actually known the critical facts." 276
Willful blindness does not comport with the cost-benefit approach to
inducement taken by the Federal Circuit in Ricoh. 2 77 There, the Federal Cir-
cuit endorsed the proposition that without inducement liability, or with only
a weak regime of inducement liability, many patent holders would be left
without a reasonable avenue for recovery when their patents are actually
infringed.278
Additionally, the Supreme Court's importation of willful blindness
serves neither the goals of moral retribution nor economic redress. A moral-
istic infringement-by-inducement regime should not be concerned with
plaintiffs' difficulties in suing numerous defendants--one of the issues ad-
dressed in Ricoh. Rather, because a moralistic regime would require a patent
holder to prove that an infringer acted with a greater level of knowledge
than required in an amoral regime, willful blindness disallows legitimately
harmed patent plaintiffs a reasonable recovery mechanism from numerous
actual infringers.
Although Global-Tech is still recent, its practical effects can already be
seen. In Aguirre v. Powerchute Sports, LLC, the plaintiff sued the defendant
for inducing infringement of the plaintiff's patent directed to a golf swing
trainer.279 The plaintiff, an individual inventor, accused the defendant of of-
fering to sell its patented invention after one the defendant's employees saw
it demonstrated at a trade show. 280 The plaintiff did not allege, however, that
the defendant actually knew that its activities would cause direct infringe-
274. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2071 n.9 (2011) (quot-
ing United States v. Holloway, 731 F.2d 378, 380-381 (6th Cir. 1984)) (internal alterations
omitted).
275. Id. at 2070.
276. Id. at 2070-71.
277. Ricoh Co. v. Quanta Computer Inc., 550 F.3d 1325, 1337-38 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (per
curiam).
278. Id. at 1338.
279. Aguirre v. Powerchute Sports, LLC, No. SA-10-CV-702-XR, 2011 WL 3359554, at
*I (W.D. Tex. Aug. 4, 2011).
280. Id. at *5.
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ment of the plaintiff's patent. After Global-Tech, the district court dismissed
the inducement claim against the defendant for this supposed deficiency.28'
Global-Tech notwithstanding, this seems unwise. The plaintiff was al-
most certainly harmed by the defendant's marketing efforts. Further, the
defendant appeared to have taken "a substantial and unjustified risk"282 in
marketing its product because its business partner developed the accused
product after watching a demonstration of the plaintiff's invention at a golf
trade show. Whether this individual did so with actual knowledge of the
plaintiff's patent, willfully blinded himself to potential infringement, or act-
ed with an "evil-meaning mind"283 should be irrelevant. Lastly, though some
of the deficiencies in the plaintiff's case could have been rectified by more
descriptive pleading, 284 it is still clear that, after Global-Tech, the plaintiff
would not be able to recover if the most he could prove was that the defend-
ant acted recklessly. A California district court disposed a similar claim on
almost identical grounds.285
Global-Tech also suggests that plaintiffs who bring their claims under
other parts of the infringement statute are equally vulnerable to similar poor
results. Claims for contributory infringement may similarly allow all but the
most morally culpable defendants free rein to infringe, even where plaintiffs
are otherwise legitimately harmed. A contributory infringement regime that
requires facts of actual knowledge or willful blindness above mere construc-
tive knowledge disallows patent holders from recovering against those who
took "a substantial and unjustified risk"286 that the end-product sold would
infringe when combined.287 This would be acceptable if the contributory
infringement statute sought to effectuate those goals of criminal law mental
states (e.g., moral condemnation of those who possessed a mental state
above "a substantial and unjustified risk" of infringement). But contributory
infringement is not concerned with such nuances. Rather, a contributory
infringement regime that imports a criminal concept of willfulness into its
provisions would allow sellers of components of patented products to sell
their components to wholesalers without knowing their intended purpose. A
willful blindness regime, here, would also allow component sellers to blind
themselves to their consumers' knowledge of how to use their product in an
infringing manner. Patent holders should be allowed to recover against such
sellers even though they are less morally culpable than those with actual
knowledge.
281. Id.
282. See Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2071.
283. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952).
284. Aguirre, 2011 WL 3359554, at *5.
285. Nazomi Comme'ns, Inc. v. Nokia Corp., No. 10-CV-4686, 2011 WL 2837401, at
*2-3 (N.D. Cal. July 14, 2011).
286. See Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2071.
287. See 35 U.S.C. § 27 1(c) (2011).
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Similarly, patent holders should not be prevented from seeking relief
from those who offer to sell their invention, even if they do not manifest a
criminal concept of intent to be bound by their own offer. Importing crimi-
nal concepts of mens rea into the patent statute here would allow
competitors to flood the market with bogus offers of the patented article that
they never actually intend to fulfill. Competitors may want to choose to
flood the market for several reasons including: (1) to test the waters for the
article's true price, (2) to artificially lower or raise the price of the invention
in a consumers' mind, or (3) to shut a patent holder out of the market entire-
ly.288
This is not as far-fetched as it may seem. In Cybiotronics, Ltd. v. Golden
Source Electronics Ltd., the plaintiff accused the defendant of offering its
patented invention for sale in the United States, only to have the sale con-
summated in Hong Kong as a backdoor way to gain a foothold in the
American marketplace. 289 The defendant raised one argument: that it be-
lieved that it did not infringe because it never intended to sell the patented
product in any event.290 Though the court ultimately dismissed the plaintiff's
claims on extraterritoriality grounds,291 it stated that it was "tempted to con-
clude that [the defendant] never made an 'offer' in this case" because it
structured its transactions such that it "was largely the 'acceptor' in the of-
fer-and-acceptance relationship that defines any 'commercial' contracting
situation."292 The plaintiff asserted that this nonetheless harmed its economic
interests in the United States.293
Preventing patent holders from recovering in these circumstances, espe-
cially where patent holders have less market power than the potentially
infringing offerors, may wholly prevent patent holders from any recovery of
the cost of their inventions, either through the marketplace or the courts. At
a minimum, it would require the patent holder to wait for an actual infring-
ing sale before proceeding with suit. This contravenes the purpose of the
inclusion of the "offer to sell" language in the infringement statute, which
"protects a patent holder at an earlier stage of infringing activity."2 94 In these
circumstances, patent holders' recovery should not be cabined by the appar-
ent morality, or immorality, of infringing offerors' conduct.
288. See 3D Sys., Inc. v. Aarotech Labs., Inc., 160 F.3d 1373, 1379 (discussing the harm
to a patent holder by generating economic interest in the invention away from the patent hold-
er).
289. Cybiotronics, Ltd. v. Golden Source Elecs., Ltd., 130 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1167-68
(C.D. Cal. 2001).
290. Id. at 1170.
291. Id. at 1173.
292. Id. at 1170 n.45.
293. Id. at 1169 n.43.
294. Id. at 1171.
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B. Criminal Concepts of Mens Rea Do Not Realistically Describe the
"Intent" Element in Patent Infringement Cases
Concepts of fault in tort law do not realistically describe the intent ele-
ment in patent infringement cases. 295 That is, "[n]o one sets out with the
goal of infringing a patent." 296 While a competitor may intend to copy a
rival's patented product, this is not to say that the competitor wishes to
infringe its rival's patent. "[O]ne would expect the converse to be closer to
reality."297 A competitor's knowledge that a rival's design is patented would
make the competitor less desirous to infringe the rival's patent.298
This argument applies with even more force in the criminal context.
One of the hallmarks of criminal mental states, similar to intent in intention-
al torts, is the requirement that the defendant intended not only to commit
the prohibited physical act, but also intended to bring about a particular
consequence of that act. As an example, the Model Penal Code's definition
of the mental state "purposefully" requires two elements: (1) a conscious
object to engage in the prohibited conduct and (2) an awareness of the cir-
cumstances of his conduct or a belief or hope that they exist.299 Thus, a
person who consciously chooses to engage in prohibited conduct, but is
unaware that his conduct will have a particular harmful consequence, does
not possess a purposeful mens rea. This is not true for purposeful conduct;
the Model Penal Code requires this two-part application of intent for every
criminal offense. 300
Yet this analysis should have little application in cases of indirect patent
infringement. First, it is doubtful that anyone wishes to perform acts that
"actively induce" or "contribute" to another's patent infringement. Rather,
an inducer would wish, in reality, only that an inducee perform the attendant
physical act giving rise to infringement but would remain wholly agnostic as
to whether or not the inducee's act infringed a patent. All else being equal,
there is little to be gained by downstream users infringing a patent. Second,
without engaging in an analysis of patents in the pertinent art, it is unlikely
that an accused infringer would be "aware" that an inducee's activities in-
fringe the asserted patent.30' And even with an analysis, it is unlikely the
295. See Rantanen, supra note 269, at 1613-14, 1631-32.
296. Id. at 1613.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a).
300. See id. § 2.02(1) ("[A] person is not guilty of an offense unless he acted purposely,
knowingly, recklessly or negligently, as the law may require, with respect to each material
element of the offense.").
301. An accused infringer may become aware of the asserted patent, however, if the
patent holder informs the accused infringer of the existence of his patent. Yet, as patent hold-
ers increasingly assert patents as an integral part of business strategy, as opposed to a simple
protection of extant property rights, such communications have become increasingly suspect.
See Ted Sichelman, The Vonage Trilogy: A Case Study in "Patent Bullying ", in PERSPECTIVES
ON PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER (Michael Abramowicz, John Duffy & F. Scott Kieff eds.,
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accused infringer would possess a "belief or hope" that the patent would be
infringed.
Just as mental states in intentional torts only poorly parallel indirect pa-
tent infringement, criminal concepts of mens rea also do not accurately
reflect the reality of indirect patent infringement. No one consciously
"wishes" for a patent to be infringed, even if he or she is aware of the exist-
ence of a related patent. Treating patent infringement like criminal conduct
in this regard serves no discernible purpose.
C. Grafting Criminal Concepts of Mens Rea onto Civil Statutes
Continues a General Trend of Improperly Equating
Civil and Criminal Law Concepts
Global-Tech also continues a general trend of improperly equating civil
and criminal law concepts. Several courts have cited Global-Tech as support
for importing criminal law concepts of mens rea into civil cases that have
nothing to do with patents. In Hokto Kinoko Co. v. Concord Farms, Inc., the
court relied on Global-Tech to import a willful blindness element in a
trademark cancellation claim, alleging that the trademark holder's attorney
was "willful[ly] blind" in listing goods on the defendant's trademark appli-
cation that it did not use or intend to use in the future.302 In United States ex
rel. Saltzman v. Textron Systems Corp., the district court, in considering the
level of knowledge required to state a claim under the Federal False Claims
Act,303 "assume[d] that a showing of willful blindness would satisfy the
knowledge requirement for a false claim," and cited Global-Tech.304 In addi-
tion, a bankruptcy court hearing the case, In re Dreier LLP, at least partially
leaned on Global-Tech to graft a willful blindness element onto a fraudulent
transfer claim. 30 While the propriety of using willful blindness in these in-
stances should be analyzed on a statute-by-statute basis, 306 the rush to use
Global-Tech to import criminal mens rea into civil statutes is disquieting.
2011) (presenting a case study where "large, established companies that threaten or institute
costly patent infringement actions of dubious merit against smaller companies, usually in
order to suppress competition or garner licensing fees"); John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley,
Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 205 (1998) (cal-
culating the large number of invalid, but asserted, patents); Rantanen, supra note 269, at 1631
("Receiving a letter from a competitor proclaiming the obviousness of infringement seems like
thin grounds on which to base the conclusion of "substantial certainty" of infringement.").
302. Hokto Kinoko Co. v. Concord Farms, Inc., 810 F Supp. 2d 1013, 1043 (C.D. Cal.
2011)
303. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-33 (2011).
304. United States ex rel. Saltzman v. Textron Sys. Corp., CIV.A. No. 09-11985-RGS,
2011 WL 2414207 at *4 n.8 (D. Mass. June 9, 2011).
305. In re Dreier LLP, 452 B.R. 391, 451 n.54 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011).
306. For example, willful blindness may be an appropriate moniker for knowledge in
federal False Claims Act cases because, unlike patent infringement litigation, the False Claims
Act does not solely concern itself with pecuniary harms.
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Global-Tech does not appear to be the progenitor of such conflation, but
only a point in a greater trend of cross-contamination between discrete con-
cepts in criminal and civil law that use similar terms. Courts have long raced
to find easy analogies to difficult statutes. This has demonstrably occurred
in the immigration context, an area of law that has struggled mightily to
identify its proper place in the civil-criminal spectrum.307 In Kungys v. United
States, for example, the Supreme Court derived a definition of the term "mate-
rial," as in a "material misrepresentation" of facts to immigration authorities,
wholly from criminal law conceptions of perjury or concealment?.30 The Court
never addressed whether differing concerns in civil-immigration violations
and criminal perjury prosecutions should mandate different results.
This happens, too, even where the phrase in the civil statute is inten-
tionally broader than its criminal twin. For example, in some civil law
statutes allowing recovery for unwanted "sexual contact," such as sexual
assault, the definition of "sexual contact" is ambiguous. 309 Commentators
focusing on the intersection of criminal and civil law in the sexual assault
context have seized on this ambiguity and cautioned against the "risk that
new statutes designed to aid sexual assault victims will import existing
criminal law problems into civil cases."3"o A less-than-contemplative confla-
tion of terms between the two areas of law may wrongly whittle away some
of "the most significant advantages that victims enjoy in tort as opposed to
criminal fora."31'
Lastly, the conflation of mens rea in civil and criminal statutes routinely
occurs in hybrid statutory schemes. Principally, doctrines requiring
consistency in statutory interpretation force such intermingling. 312 But the
goals of criminal as opposed to civil arenas do not always align. Most
famously, the Supreme Court's equating the term "pattern" in civil and
criminal aspects of the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act in
H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co. did not address whether the
"patterns of racketeering" sought to be criminally punished should differ
from the "patterns of racketeering" sought to be civilly enforced. 313 It is fair
to suggest that principles of statutory construction and concepts of
congressional intent outweigh whatever nuances are normatively desired
from a perfectly composed anti-racketeering statute. But the Court's failure
307. See generally Peter L. Markowitz, Straddling the Civil-Criminal Divide: A Bifur-
cated Approach to Understanding the Nature of Immigration Removal Proceedings, 43 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 289 (2008).
308. Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 770 (1988).
309. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:61B-l(2) (West 2005).
310. Ellen M. Bublick, Tort Suits Filed by Rape and Sexual Assault Victims in Civil
Courts: Lessons for Courts, Classrooms and Constituencies, 59 SMU L. REv. 55, 73 (2006).
311. Id. at 72.
312. See generally Jonathan Marx, Note, How to Construe a Hybrid Statute, 93 VA. L.
REV. 235 (2007) (discussing courts' reluctance against dual construction, even where the crim-
inal side of a hybrid statute includes a mens rea that its civil counterpart does not).
313. H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 236 (1989).
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to at least mention these potential differences in H.J. Inc. speaks of a greater
movement to remain silent as criminal mental states expand into civil areas.
D. Courts Should Define Mental State Elements in Civil Statutes
According to Their Purposes
The kaleidoscope of terms used to describe mens rea well addresses the
need of mental states in criminal law. They often reconcile competing con-
cerns: they work to ascribe a level of moral culpability to the defendant,
separate those acts requiring civil restitution from those precipitating crimi-
nal punishment, and insulate otherwise innocently acting defendants from
the maw of the criminal process.314 But many civil statutes do not have such
goals. Blindly using criminal mental state definitions in the civil context
seems to poorly further the goals of civil statutes.
In interpreting the mental state requirement for civil statutes, courts
should consider those statutes' goals. Numerous civil statutes-including
many provisions of the patent infringement statute-have no mental state
requirement at all. 315 The constitutional due process concerns with requiring
defendants to possess "evil-meaning minds"1 6 before imposing liability for
their acts are absent in the civil context. 317 The issues of morality, fairness,
guilt, and innocence that are so deeply interwoven into criminal mens rea
analysis do not always come to bear in the civil context. Direct infringe-
ment, in particular, would suffer from treatment as criminal conduct. It has
no mental state requirement and is designed simply to compensate patent
holders for infringing uses. And it is unlike other property torts in that it has
little moral or utilitarian basis. 318 The concern voiced in Morissette that
"wrongdoing must be conscious to be criminal"319 would be misplaced in
the direct infringement context. Applying criminal mental states to strict
liability civil statutes, such as that governing direct infringement, risks treat-
ing civil violations as criminal conduct.
Other civil statutes that do contain mental state requirements seek to ef-
fectuate very different policy goals than those in the criminal context. In
employment discrimination actions under Title VII, for example, a plaintiff
seeking to prove her employer's discriminatory motivation must show that
the employer harbored an "intent to discriminate." 320 Yet, "[i]n this context,
314. See supra Part II.
315. See supra notes 135-158 and accompanying text.
316. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952).
317. Conn. Bar Ass'n v. United States, 620 F.3d 81, 102 (2d Cir. 2010) ("Strict liability
generally raises due process concerns with respect to criminal, not civil, statutes.").
318. See supra Part tI.A.
319. Morissette, 342 U.S. at 252.
320. Rudin v. Lincoln Land Cmty. Coll., 420 E3d 712, 720 (7th Cir. 2005) ("The method
of proving race discrimination by putting forth evidence of discriminatory motivation often is
called the 'direct' method. A plaintiff proceeding according to the direct method may rely on
two types of evidence: direct evidence or circumstantial evidence. ... Direct evidence is a
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the language of intention means that a causal link must be found between an
employment action and the plaintiff's race, sex, or other protected character-
istic-not that a deliberately or consciously discriminatory purpose is
required."321 Assessing civil employment discrimination under the same ru-
bric as criminal conduct would simply create additional hurdles for
plaintiffs. Similar heightened standards of proof in the Title VII context
"do[] not meet the public policy goal of prohibiting discrimination and retal-
iatory discharges."322
Even civil mental-state requirements seemingly pregnant with criminal
meaning do not necessarily incorporate the elements of vice associated with
criminal law. In the bankruptcy context, for example, a debtor cannot dis-
charge a debt stemming from a "willful and malicious injury by the debtor
to another entity or to the property of another entity."323 Despite the fact that
such a standard appears to be directly lifted from criminal law, "[t]he focus
of the 'malicious' inquiry is on the debtor's actual knowledge or the reason-
able foreseeability that his conduct will result in injury to the creditor, not
on abstract and perhaps moralistic notions of the 'wrongfulness' of the
debtor's act."324 To be clear, this is not to say that no civil statutes that incor-
porate mental states do so for reasons traditionally associated with criminal
enforcement.3 25 Rather, courts seeking to give gloss to civil statutes contain-
ing mental states should not assume that they do.
As defining mental states is mainly an issue of statutory interpretation,
the burden rests on courts to prevent the problems associated with treating
civil liability as criminal conduct. In interpreting mental states in civil stat-
utes, courts should begin their inquiries by addressing, first, whether and
why the legislature included a mental state requirement. Courts should re-
member that mental states in the criminal law typically serve very different
purposes than those in the civil law. While the absence of a mental state in a
criminal statute may implicate constitutional due process concerns, there are
no such worries in the civil context. Thus, where a civil liability statute does
not appear to contain a mental state, courts should be reluctant to read one
in.
Second, where a civil statute does appear to contain a mental state re-
quirement, such as "actively induce" in the induced infringement statute,
'distinct' type of evidence that uniquely reveals 'intent to discriminate[, which] is a mental
state.' ") (internal citations omitted).
321. Katharine T. Bartlett, Making Good on Good Intentions: The Critical Role of Moti-
vation in Reducing Implicit Workplace Discrimination, 95 VA. L. REV. 1893, 1922 (2009)
(emphasis added).
322. Kotewa v. Living Independence Network Corp., No. CV05-426-S-EJL, 2007 WL
433544, at *7 (D. Idaho Feb. 2, 2007).
323. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (2011).
324. In re Musgrave, BAP Nos. CO- 0-049, 08-25165, 2011 WL 312883, at *11 (10th
Cir. Feb. 2, 2011).
325. See supra notes 134-148 and accompanying text (describing the purpose of morali-
ty embodied in civil securities violations).
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courts should begin their inquiry by characterizing its purpose (e.g., remedi-
al, deterrence, regulatory, etc.). Whatever the statute's purpose, an
interpretation of its attendant mental state should further that goal. Interpre-
tations of mental states in remedial statutes, for example, should likely be
given wider berth than their regulatory counterparts.
And lastly, where a civil statute appears to include a mental state from
the criminal law, courts should pause. Courts should not simply assume that
the legislature used words similar to those in the criminal law to import their
definitions-or the baggage that comes with them. Irrespective of the simi-
larity of terms, courts should still assess if the purposes of the statute are
different from those in criminal law, such as regulation rather than moral
condemnation. Once this purpose is elucidated, courts should ensure that the
contours of the particular statute's mental state requirement align with its
purpose. While, absent Congressional action, it may be too late to effect
meaningful change in the interpretation of mental states for patent infringe-
ment, this three-part method of statutory interpretation would prevent
construing civil liability as criminal conduct.
CONCLUSION
The mens rea requirement in criminal law stands in bold relief to the
mental state requirements in civil law. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court vio-
lated this longstanding separation between criminal and civil mental states
in its decision in Global-Tech Appliances v. SEB S.A. There, the Court im-
ported the criminal mens rea element of willful blindness into the
inducement provision of the patent infringement statute. This importation
failed to take account of the different purposes behind mens rea in criminal
actions-to ascribe moral culpability, to separate crime from tort, and to
shield innocently acting defendants from punishment-from the economic
purposes of the patent infringement statute. Global-Tech does not advance
the economically remedial goals of patent infringement, and the Court's far-
reaching language suggests that such an interpretive technique will have
consequences outside of patent law.
Courts should take Global-Tech as a moral. Importing criminal concepts
of mens rea into the patent statute disallows legitimately harmed patent
holders a form of economic recovery. More generally, importing criminal
concepts of mens rea into civil statutes continues a general trend of improp-
erly equating civil and criminal law concepts. Recognizing this, courts
should develop an appropriate interpretive scheme to address mental state
requirements in civil statutes. Such a scheme should principally consist of
three canons: (1) courts should avoid importing a mental state in a civil stat-
ute where none appears to be present; (2) where a mental state does appear
to be present, courts should characterize the purpose of the statute in guid-
ing an appropriate interpretation; and (3) even where a civil mental state
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uses familiar language from the criminal law, courts should avoid import-
ing a criminal law concept of mens rea unless the purposes of the civil
statute are similar to the moral and protective purposes found in criminal
law. This interpretive technique would prevent other areas of civil law
from what happened in Global-Tech: the treatment of patent infringement
as criminal conduct.
